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Abstract  In this paper we study the behavior of the real exchange rate of three North American
currencies vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar: the Canadian dollar the Mexican peso, and the Panamanian
Balboa.  Our principal object is to design an experiment in which meaningful comparisons of behavior
across regimes would be possible.  In the main we were unable to find any.  The allegation of problems
created due to aggregating data across regimes therefore receives no support at all in these data.   A
second criterion for choosing the countries in our sample was differences in level of economic
development.  The object here was to provide ample leeway for real variables to operate.  For Mexico
such factors do not appear to matter.   For Panama they might be of some importance, but a modified
form of PPP nevertheless continues to perform well.
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In this paper we study the behavior of the real exchange rate of three North American
currencies vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar: the Canadian dollar the Mexican peso, and the Panamanian
Balboa.  Our principal object in doing so is to investigate the effects of alternative exchange-rate
regimes, including currency union, on real exchange rate behavior.  Our choice of countries here is
purposeful.  Panama has been linked via a one-to-one exchange rate to the United States since it
received its independence in the early part of the last century.  Its currency, the Balboa, is for all
practical purposes simply a unit of account.  Panama therefore serves as a good example of a currency
union.  Canada and Mexico in contrast have independent currencies, but share common borders with
and have strong real side linkages to the United States via both goods and labor markets.  They
therefore provide useful benchmarks for assessing the Panamanian experience.
In the next section of the paper we deal with theoretical considerations and review the relevant
literature. In the third section, we present an historical overview of the four countries’ exchange-rate
experience during the varying periods for which we have data.  We then go on to present empirical
evidence on the short- and long-run behavior of the three real exchange rates.  The methods that we use
here range from simple graphical analysis, to unit root tests and Chow-type tests of temporal and spatial
stability.   The last section presents conclusions and outlines further research.
The key theoretical concept underlying our analysis of regime effects and of real exchange rate
behavior more generally is purchasing power parity.  In its simplest formulation, purchasing power
parity posits equality between the price level in one country and the exchange-rate adjusted price level
in the other.  It therefore treats the real exchange rate -- the nominal exchange rate divided by the ratio
of the two countries' price levels -- as a constant.  This constancy, moreover, is posited to exist across
exchange-rate regimes.  The regime therefore is viewed as neutral.
How close this description is to actual experience depends importantly on how the real
exchange rate behaves under different regimes, whether it tends toward some stable value over time
under the different regimes and whether this pattern of movements is itself invariant to the regime. 2
Studies of real exchange rate behavior over the past decade and a half have differed in their conclusions
about these questions.
1  According to one line of reasoning, PPP and explanations of exchange-rate
behavior that are based upon it lost their usefulness following the shift to floating exchange rates by the
United States and other industrial countries in the early 1970s.  Real exchange rates by this account
became excessively variable and rather than tending to revert to stable equilibria behaved in a
completely random fashion. Later findings have been much more supportive of PPP, but these in turn
have been called into question.  One objection centers on the possible adverse econometric effects of
data heterogeneity, of combining data for varied exchange rate regimes, and of the applicability to the
current float of results obtained with such data.  Another centers on sample selection bias since the
preponderance of evidence on real exchange rate behavior and PPP has been derived from industrial-
country experience.  A third objection focuses on problems inherent to the unit-root tests that have been
the backbone of much of the recent econometric research.  The empirical results presented in this paper
speaks to these issues.
I.  Theoretical Considerations
To understand the relationship between nominal and real exchange rates and their relationship,
in turn,  to purchasing power parity, consider the following expression for the real exchange rate:
qi,t / eit - pi,t + p US,t , (1)
where qit  is the log of the real exchange rate of country i relative to the United States, eit is the log of
the corresponding nominal exchange rate, the domestic currency price of a U.S. dollar, and pi,t and
pUS,t t are the logarithms of the ith country and the U.S. price levels respectively.  If  purchasing power
parity holds perfectly, qit will equal a constant, call it G qi.  In this case, we can rewrite equation (1) as:
  pi,t - eit = G q i  +p US,t. (2)3
This formulation is of particular use in analysis of behavior under alternative regimes.   Under
fixed exchange rates, the nominal exchange rate eit also is constant, and in the case of currency union,
equal to unity.  Under fixed exchange rates, equation (2) therefore links the two countries’ price levels
It is therefore a macroeconomic version of the law of one price.  Under floating exchange rates, in
contrast, (2) is a relation among price levels and the nominal exchange rate, or alternatively between
the exchange-rate adjusted price level in the country and the actual price level in the other.
We can thus think of equation (2) as defining a cointegrating relation between these two
variables.  To see this more clearly, consider the following stochastic analogue to (2):
pat = a  +b  p US,t +u t , (3)
where pait = p i,t  - eit , the exchange-rate adjusted price level in country i, a and b are coefficients, and
ut is an error term.
Viewed from the perspective of (3), long-run PPP requires b to be unity and ut to be stationary. 
If we impose the condition b= 1, we can then apply a simple unit root test to the real exchange rate
itself to test for cointegration.  We do this below.
One set of conditions under which PPP will hold reasonably well is when growth in money
supply in one country has been rapid and far in excess of  growth in money supply in the other. The
other situation in which it will do well empirically is if the real factors have effects that are merely
persistent rather than truly permanent. This latter possibility has both theoretical and empirical appeal. 
It is an implications of the neo-classical growth model.  It also appears characteristic of  very long-term
data such as the various relative price series investigated by Froot, Rogoff and Kim (1995) and the
nearly four-century long guilder-sterling real exchange rate data studied by Lothian (1998a).  Perhaps
more important such behavior also appears to be a features of U.S. dollar real exchange rate behavior
under the current float as Lothian (1998b) has argued.4
I.A. Previous Studies
In the early 1970s, an extreme version of the exchange-rate theory sketched above was the
prevailing paradigm.  As the 1980s drew to a close, however, even more moderate versions stood in
discredit. Then during the course of the 1990s the, the pendulum of professional opinion took another
swing.  Studies using both long-term times series data and multi-country panel data for recent decades
both painted pictures that appeared more favorable to PPP than earlier studies.
2  These later studies
pointed to mean-reverting behavior of one sort or another for a wide variety of real exchange rates over
a wide variety of time periods.  Deviations from PPP are persistent, but in the end seemed largely
(though most likely not completely) to disappear.
That evidence, however, is now being questioned.  Much of it comes from examination of long
historical time series for the major industrial countries.  Both aspects — the long periods spanned and
the sample of countries investigated — are viewed by some commentators as potential problems.  
The long data span has meant combining observations for fixed-  and for floating-rate periods. 
This, it is claimed, is a source of aggregation bias.  Plausible as this characterization may be, it has
gone largely untested.  One exception is Lothian and Taylor (1996) who use relationships estimated
with data for long periods prior to the advent of the current U.S. float  to forecast dollar-sterling and
franc-sterling nominal exchange rates over that period.  Their simple AR(1) models out-forecast the
usual naive models in both instances, particularly at longer horizons.  These AR(1) formulations,
moreover, prove stable in Chow-type tests when data for the float and pre-float periods are combined. 
Further evidence is provided in an earlier paper of ours (Lothian and McCarthy, 2000) that tests the
aggregation-bias hypotheses using data for Ireland.  We find no evidence there to support that
hypothesis. 
The emphasis on industrial countries is also viewed as a source of problems.  Because such
countries have been at similar stages of economic development throughout most of the periods being 
studied, real variables it is claimed have had little scope in which to operate.  This, it is claimed
further, results in sample selection bias.  Proponents of this view have presented no evidence to support
it.  The evidence that does exist, moreover, is unfavorable (see Lothian, 1998b).5
A related objection has to do with the relative impacts of nominal and real variables in the
samples under consideration and the alleged inability of conventional econometric techniques to
separate the influences of the two.  According to proponents of this view, the greater incidence and
magnitude of nominal shocks in samples that include data for floating rate regimes make it difficult if
not virtually impossible to detect real influences econometrically.  Researchers, they claim, are
therefore led to accept the hypothesis of real-exchange-rate stationarity erroneously.
3
Our data allow us to explore all of these issues. The substantial differences over time and
across countries in regime described below provide the necessary degrees of freedom for tests of the
aggregation-bias hypothesis.  The differences in the extent of economic development of the United
States on the one hand and Mexico and Panama on the other allow us to investigate the sample-
selection-bias question.   The similarity in levels of development and the absence of sharp divergences
in the monetary policies of the two countries allow us to address the issue of real-exchange rate non-
stationarity in a more satisfactory manner.
II.  Empirical Results  
We begin with an historical overview of exchange-rate and associated economic and monetary 
experience in the four countries being studied.  We then go on to present several bodies of empirical
evidence on exchange-rate behavior across the various monetary regimes that have existed for these
countries over our sample period.
II.A. Historical Overview: Exchange-Rate Regimes
Panama for all intents and purposes is on a U.S. dollar standard.  The dollar circulates freely
and has been linked one-to-one with the Balboa since 1904.  Mexico and Canada, in contrast, have had
much more varied and otherwise quite different exchange-rate experience than Panama.
Over the sixty years that our data for Mexico cover, that country’s exchange rate regime has
alternated between periods in which the peso was allowed to float more or less freely relative to the
U.S. dollar and periods in which it was rather rigidly pegged.  These latter periods, in turn, have6
themselves varied considerably in the degree to which the peg worked and hence in the degree to which
the exchange rate remained stable.
Over the entire sample period it was far from so.  Depreciation of the peso relative to the U.S.
dollar has been the rule rather than the exception.  Since 1939, the peso has depreciated by slightly
over 750 per cent, with close to nine tenths of that depreciation, in turn, coming during the course of
the past two and a half decades. 
In the fifteen years prior to 1939, the peso-dollar rate, though in several instances virtually
constant for a number of years at time, more than doubled.  Then during World War II and the years
immediately following, stability ensued.  That, however, did not last and between 1948 and 1954 the
peso underwent a series of substantial devaluations.
Beginning in April 1954, the situation again changed and the peso entered its longest period of
stability. The official rate was set at 12.50 (old) pesos per U.S. dollar and that rate was maintained for
the next 22 years, albeit with some difficulty in the latter years of that period, due to much more
expansive monetary policy in Mexico than in the United States in the early 1970s.
In September 1976 the peso was devalued and during the remainder of that year was left to
float.  It stabilized at 22.5 pesos per U.S. dollar and remained in that general range until 1982.  From
that point on the peso has depreciated continually via a series of abrupt step-like movements that by
1999 had brought it to a level of 9560 old pesos per U.S. dollar.
The Canadian dollar-U.S. dollar exchange rate, by comparison, has been much more nearly
constant.  Our data for Canada begin in 1870.  At the time, Canada, like the United Kingdom, was on
the gold standard.  From then until the United States returned to gold in 1879, the Canadian dollar.
therefore, floated relative to the U.S. dollar.
With Canada and the United States on gold from 1879 until World War I, a fixed exchange rate
between the two countries’ currencies prevailed.  Fixed exchange rates, however, effectively broke
down during the war and were not reestablished until 1925, when Canada, again like the United
Kingdom, went back to gold.  This second gold-standard period, however, proved to be of short
duration.  Canada left gold in 1931 in response to the Great Depression and during the remainder of the7
inter-war years, alternated between pegged rates relative to the U.S. dollar and a float.  World War II
brought pegged and heavily controlled exchange rates and the decade and a half thereafter pegged rates
coupled with devaluations of the Canadian dollar (1948-1951).  From 1952 to 1962, the Canadian
dollar floated and then in 1962 fixed exchange rate returned only to give way to floating rates once
again in 1970.  The Canadian dollar has floated since then and over the past decade depreciated
substantially relative to the U.S. dollar. 
II.B. A Summary of the Data 
The price data that we use are consumer price indexes for Canada, Mexico, Panama and the
United States for periods of varying length over the 1870 to 1999.   Data for the last 50 years came
from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics, both hard copy and CD ROM
versions.   Sources of earlier data are described in a separate appendix available from the authors on
request. Exchange rates are foreign currency vs. U.S. dollar rates.
  Shown in Figures 1 through 3 are plots of the logs of the price levels in the three countries
against the U.S. price level and of the corresponding log real exchange rates.  The price series plotted
in the charts for Canada and Mexico are CPIs that have been adjusted by exchange rates to put them on
a U.S. dollar basis.  For Panama, of course, no such adjustment is needed.  Two features of the charts
deserve comment. One is the substantial positive correlation between the four price series.  All follow
substantial and very similar upward trends over the periods for which data are available.  The visual
impression therefore is of tolerably stable relationships between domestic CPIs and the U.S. CPI in all
three instances.  The other feature of interest is the dramatic difference between the behavior of the
price and real exchange rate series.  In two cases -- Canada and Mexico -- the real exchange rates
appear to be virtually without trend.  In the third case -- Panama -- the  real exchange rate does appears
to follow an upward trend, but it is exceedingly moderate and hence quite different from the trend
followed by the CPIs.  Both aspects of the data are consistent with the predictions of PPP.8
II.C.  Short-term Variability
Shown in Table 1 are means and standard deviations of the price series and the real exchange
rates for both the full period and for various subperiods. For Canada and Mexico the subperiods were
chosen to reflect temporal differences in the exchange rate regime; for Panama which maintained a
currency union with the United States continuously, the subperiods reflect differences in the behavior
of other economic variables that could conceivably affect real exchange rates.
The subperiod means exhibit time patterns similar to those of the plotted series -- substantial
increases in the means of the CPIs and little or no increases in the means of the real exchange rates.   
The standard deviations provide information on possible cross-regime differences in real exchange rate
variability.  For the most part we see no consistent differences. The one difference that is visible in
these data is between the variability of the real U.S. dollar exchange rate of Panama and the variability
of the real U.S. dollar exchange rates of Canada and Mexico.  Currency union seems to matter but not
fixed versus floating rates more generally.
4
We investigate this issue further using both graphical analysis and dummy variable regressions.
Let us turn to the graphical analysis first.  Shown in Figures 4 through 6 are variance decompositions
of the three log real exchange rates by subperiods.  These are based on: 
Var[qi ] =  Var[ei]+  Var[pi/pUS] - 2 Cov[ei, pi/pUS] (4)
where Var[x] and Cov[x,y] denote the variance of x and the covariance of x and y, respectively, and
all other symbols are as defined earlier.  Data for Canada are plotted in two charts: Figure 4a shows
data for subperiods between 1870 and 1938; Figure 4b shows data for subperiods from 1939 to 1999. 
Figures 5 and 6 show data for Mexico and Panama, respectively.  These data begin in 1939 and are for
the same subperiods as for Canada.   Since Panama in effect had a exchange rate of unity throughout
the sample period, no variance decomposition is possible.  We do however plot two measures of real
exchange rate variability.  One set of figures is for the standard deviation of the log real exchange rate
the same measure used in the other three graphs.  The other is for the standard deviations of the de-9
trended log real exchange rate.   The vertical scales for the charts for Canada and Panama are one
twentieth the scale for Mexico.
Several aspects of these charts deserve comment.  The first is the greater within-country
variability of Canada’s and Mexico’s real exchange rates from 1972 on than before that date.  This
period in both instances is one of substantial nominal exchange rate variability -- floating rate in the
case of Canada and a mixture of floating rates and pegged but changing rates in the other.  A second
thing to notice is the sizable covariance terms for Mexico in the subperiods from 1972 on.  These are
periods in which variation in both nominal exchange rates and relative price levels increases markedly. 
The increase in the covariance between the two is exactly what one would expect to see under
purchasing power parity.  The final thing to notice in these graphs is the lower variability of Panama’s
real exchange rate throughout the sample period than the other two countries’ real exchange rates.
This difference between Panama on the one hand and Canada and Mexico on the other is
highlighted further in the regressions shown in Table 2.  The dependent variables in these regressions
were the subperiod standard deviations shown in Table 1.  The independent variables were two regime
dummies and a dummy to control for World War II.  The first regime dummy was for all fixed-rate
observations including those for currency union; the second for currency union alone.  Only the second
matters.  It is significantly different from zero and negative. 
 II.D.  Unit Root Tests and Long-run Behavior 
Table 3 presents econometric evidence on long-run behavior. The question that it addresses is
the stationarity of the real exchange rates and hence the nature of the long-term relation linking the
nominal exchange rates and the foreign-country and U.S. price levels.  The test results shown there are
for augmented Dickey-Fuller tests and Phillips-Perron tests for the three log real exchange rates and
their log price-level and, where appropriate, log nominal-rate components.  These were run both for
levels and first differences of the variables.  The components in almost all instances are non-stationary
in levels but stationary in first differences.  The results for real exchange rates, which are the principal
concern here, are somewhat mixed.  10
In terms of level of statistical significance, the results are strongest for Mexico.  Using both test
variants we reject the unit-root null for the log levels at well below the 1% level.  For Canada, in
contrast, we cannot reject even at the 10% level, while for Panama we can reject at 1%, but only after
allowance for a deterministic trend.
At first glance, these findings seem to suggest an inverse relation between the degree to which
PPP holds and to the variability of nominal exchange rates.
5  This is clearly quite counterintuitive. If
anything, one would expect PPP to hold more closely under a common currency than in a situation,
such as that of Mexico, in which nominal exchange rates had changed substantially.  Yet the two
appear to be about the same while Canada with much more stable nominal exchange rates than Mexico
appears to perform worst.
We are, however, somewhat hesitant to embrace such a ranking for several reasons.  One is the
possibility that the Canadian results are simply a statistical fluke.  When we truncated the Canadian 
sample and ended anywhere from the early to the mid-1990s, rather than 1999, we consistently rejected
the unit root null.  Only when we added the data for the last five years did that become impossible. 
The obvious question that arises is whether these recent observations are just outliers or are indicative
of some permanent behavioral change.
A second reason to be circumspect about these results is that unit-root tests, however useful
they may be in many instances, are hardly the sole criterion by which to judge long-run real exchange
rate behavior.  A simple alternative metric, nominal exchange rate predictability, in fact gives a quite
different ranking.  By this criterion Mexico ranks third, Canada second and, if we allow for the trend,
Panama first.  The standard deviations of the log real exchange rates of the first two countries are .182
and .093, respectively, while the standard error of estimate in a regression of the log real exchange rate
of Panama on time is .061.  11
II.E.  Behavior Across Regime  
Table 4 presents estimates of AR(1) models for the three countries’ real rates and reports the
results of Chow-type tests that we used to assess the stability of the relationships across regimes. 
Included in these regressions are dummy variables to allow both slopes and intercepts to vary across
regimes and across countries.  Since heteroskedasticity is liable to pose a problem we use
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors throughout.  In no instance, are either the regime slope or
intercept dummy significant.  This is true for Canada and Mexico individually as well three countries
taken as a group.  The country dummies are, however, significant.  At first glance these differences
might seem to be regime connected given the currency union between the United States and Panama. 
On closer inspection, this does not seem to be the case at all.  Canada is the reference point in these
regressions. The significant country dummies in the pooled regression imply significant differences
between Mexico and Panama on the one hand and Canada on the other, but not significant differences
between Mexico and Panama of the sort that would exist if the country dummies were picking up
regime-related effects.  The difference between the estimated slope coefficients for the latter two
countries is non-zero but nevertheless well within the range of error in the equations.  The allegation
that the regime matters and that aggregation bias is therefore a problem in time series tests of PPP
remains unproven.
III.  Conclusions   
We reach two sets of conclusion.  The first has to do with the overall performance of
purchasing power parity in the data that we examined.   In each of the three cases we find at least some
evidence supporting the hypothesis.  For both Mexico and Panama we find evidence of real exchange
rate stationarity, absolute stationarity in the case of Mexico and trend stationarity in the case of
Panama.  In the case of Canada the real exchange rate appears to have been stationary over most of the
period but a shift may have occurred during the past decade.  In any event, errors in predicting nominal 
 exchange rates on the basis of PPP are quite small for Canada, as also is the case for Panama once a
trend is taken into account.12
Our second set of conclusions concerns the criticisms recently directed at the empirical
exchange-rate literature.  An important criterion underlying our choice of countries was diversity of
experience with regard to the exchange-rate regime.  The object was to design an experiment in which
meaningful comparisons of behavior across regimes would be possible.  In the main we were unable to
find any.  The allegation of problems created due to aggregating data across regimes therefore receives
no support at all in these data.   A second criterion for choosing the countries in our sample was
differences in level of economic development.  The object here was to provide ample leeway for real
variables to operate.  For Mexico such factors do not appear to matter.   For Panama they might be of
some importance, but a modified form of PPP nevertheless continues to perform well. 13
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Table 1a: Canada Means and Standard Deviations
p US p CA qCA
1871-1879 Mean 1.989 1.725 0.118
St dev 0.093 0.079 0.079
1880-1913 Mean 1.795 1.718 0.077
St dev 0.061 0.083 0.049
1914-1918 Mean 2.032 2.089 -0.048
St dev 0.173 0.176 0.022
1919-1925 Mean 2.447 2.443 0.097
St dev 0.060 0.128 0.029
1926-1931 Mean 2.401 2.334 0.084
St dev 0.053 0.028 0.020
1932-1938 Mean 2.195 2.167 0.093
St dev 0.034 0.057 0.045
1939-1947 Mean 2.403 2.413 0.195
St dev 0.158 0.091 0.065
1948-1951 Mean 2.780 2.703 0.194
St dev 0.039 0.092 0.049
1952-1962 Mean 2.917 2.813 0.074
St dev 0.050 0.067 0.032
1963-1968 Mean 3.053 3.057 0.148
St dev 0.048 0.059 0.011
1969-1971 Mean 3.233 3.186 0.132
St dev 0.050 0.003 0.015
1972-1985 Mean 3.824 3.902 0.158
St dev 0.328 0.468 0.083
1986-1999 Mean 4.514 4.803 0.251
St dev 0.138 0.165 0.113
Note: pus is log level CPI for the US.   pca is the exchange-rate adjusted  log 
level CPI and qca  the log real exchange rate for Canada.16
Table 1b: Mexico Means and Standard Deviations
pUS pME qME
1939-1947 Mean 2.403 -9.907 1.691
St dev 0.158 0.407 0.304
1948-1954 Mean 2.816 -8.403 1.774
St dev 0.053 0.284 0.157
1955-1976 Mean 3.130 -7.194 1.579
St dev 0.223 0.344 0.092
1977-1982 Mean 3.922 -4.874 1.559
St dev 0.185 0.794 0.159
1983-1994 Mean 4.383 2.981 1.721
St dev 0.136 2.743 0.188
1994-1999 Mean 4.653 7.129 1.694
St dev 0.034 0.462 0.117
Note: pus is the log level CPI for the US,  pME is the exchange-rate adjusted
 log level CPI and qME  the log real exchange rate for Mexico.17
Table 1c: Panama Means and Standard Deviations
 pPA  pUS qPA
1939-1947 Mean 3.353 2.403 -0.950
St dev 0.208 0.158 0.080
1948-1962 Mean 3.572 2.872 -0.699
St dev 0.023 0.074 0.085
1962-1972 Mean 3.643 3.120 -0.524
St dev 0.057 0.117 0.062
1973-1986 Mean 4.271 3.893 -0.378
St dev 0.238 0.313 0.079
1987-1989 Mean 4.538 4.354 -0.184
St dev 0.002 0.043 0.041
1990-1999 Mean 4.600 4.586 -0.014
St dev 0.034 0.081 0.048
       Note: pUS is the log level CPI for the US, pPA is the log level CPI 
     and qPA the log real exchange rate for Panama.
              Table 2. Regressions to test for differences in variability across
            nominal exchange rate regimes
 
    Constant    DUNION       DWWII    DFIXED    R
2/SEE
0.070  -0.065  0.100  0.012  0.348 
3.815  -1.955  2.501  0.401  0.060
0.075  -0.058  0.105  0.343 
5.236  -2.066  2.848  0.060
Note: The dependent variable is the pooled series of standard deviations
of the real exchange rate for the periods listed in Table 1.  DFIXED is
a dummy for all fixed-rate periods including the period of currency
union between Panama and US. DUNION is a dummy for the period of
currency union alone; and DWWII is a dummy for World War II. 
Figures below the coefficients are t values.18
Table 3. Unit root tests 
Series Canada Mexico Panama 
DOMESTIC PRICES 1871-1999 1939-1999 1939-1999
  Log Levels 
     ADF 1.977 0.745 -0.589
      P-P 1.597 1.780 -1.388
   First Differences
     ADF -6.274 -3.398 -2.427
     P-P -6.434 -3.247 -3.868
US PRICES  
  Log Levels
     ADF 1.199 -0.615 -0.615
     P-P 2.188 -0.101 -0.101
  First Differences
     ADF -5.155 -2.858 -2.858
     P-P -4.994 -3.623 -3.623
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE
  Log Levels
     ADF -1.164 0.492
     PP -0.722 1.380
  First Differences
     ADF -9.133 -3.763
     PP -9.005 -3.654
REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
  Log Levels
     ADF -2.311 -4.823 -4.567
     P-P -2.073 -3.760 -4.458
  First Difference
     ADF -9.314 -5.737 -6.246
     P-P -9.260 -7.005 -6.451
Note: ADF is Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root test with the  appropriate
number of lagged differences determined by the Akaike criterion.  P-P is the
Phillips-Perron unit root test with the window width set at 3 or 4.  The critical
values for .01,.05 and .10 significance levels are:
1871-1999: -3.48, -2.88 and -2.58
1939-1999: -3.54, -2.91 and -2.59
The critical values for .01,.05 and .10 significance levels in regressions with a
trend are:
1939-1999: -4.12, -3.49 and -3.17.19
Table 4.  Regressions to test differences across regimes  
Variable Coefficient S.E. t-Statistic
Canada
Intercept  0.015  0.007  1.993
qt-1  0.919  0.050  18.386
DFIXED -0.014  0.012 -1.178





Intercept  0.630  0.398  1.581
qt-1  0.627  0.224  2.804
DFIXED -0.008  0.471 -0.017 





Intercept -9.612  3.331 -2.886
qt-1  0.739  0.092  8.055





Intercept 0.012  0.007  1.748
qt-1 0.937  0.044  21.435
DFIXED -0.006  0.008 -0.704
DFIXED× qt-1  -0.014  0.024 -0.570
DMEX  0.613  0.218  2.810
DMEX× qt-1  -0.307  0.131 -2.350
DPAN -9.556  3.230 -2.959
DPAN× qt-1  -0.184  0.103 -1.809
DPAN× time  0.005  0.002  2.963




        DFIXED is a dummy for fixed exchange rates, DMEX and  DPAN
         are dummies for Mexico and Panama.  Standard errors are White’s
    heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors2021222324
1. The literature alluded to immediately below is reviewed in the next section of this paper.   For
recent surveys of this literature see Edison, et al. (1997) and Taylor (1995).
2. Studies using long time series include Diebold, et al. (1991), Lothian (1990), Johnson (1993),
Lothian and Taylor, (1996), and Taylor (1996). Panel-data studies in include Frankel and Rose (1996)
and Lothian (1997).
3. See Engel (19XX).  A less sophisticated version of this objection is advanced in Cuddington
and Liang (2000).  As Lothian and Taylor (2000) point out in their response to that study, the important
question is not whether non-stationarity can be uncovered statistically but whether it is important
economically.
4. Mussa (1986) investigates regime effects using a wide variety of exchange-rate data.  His
results point to systematically higher variability of real exchange rates under floating rate regimes than
under fixed. He explains this finding using a monetary model with exchange-rate overshooting.  In such
a model, the nominal exchange rate adjusts quickly and overshoots following a monetary shock, while
the relative price level adjusts slowly.  In the initial part of the process,  variability of both nominal and 
real exchange rates increase; only later does the variability of the relative price level also increase.
5. Other researchers have concluded much the same thing in studies in which the behavior of  real
exchange rates internationally and intra-nationally are being compared.  It has generally been possible
to reject the unit root null with the international data but not with the intra-national data. See, e.g.,
Engle and Rogers (1995), Bayoumi and Macdonald (1998), and Culver and David Papell (1999).  
Chen and Devereux (1999), however, dispute this interpretation 
Notes